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Abstract
The paper presents an overview of the recovery from the re which took place in BA3 on 13th
May 1997. Brief outlines are given of the material damage sustained, the pollution encountered,
and the cleaning processes employed. Repairs and cleaning of the building and equipment took over
2 months to complete at a cost in excess of 10 MCHF. The SPS physics program was interrupted
for a period of 10 weeks and the LEP start-up was delayed for 6 weeks.
The experience gained by the co-ordination team is discussed and advice which may be useful
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A report has already been produced by W. Weingarten (TIS) [1] containing a technical description of the origin
of the re, together with the lessons to be learned from a personnel safety perspective. This paper will therefore
not cover the details already treated therein, but will concentrate on the experience gained by the co-ordination
team.
The repair and cleaning of the aected building spanned 8 weeks. In the order of 10 weeks of SPS physics
were lost and around 6 weeks for LEP, including the subsequent start up.
No one was injured in any way by the re.
A fact-nding commission was set up to investigate the causes of the re comprising: J. Fivet (TIS),
P.K. Frandsen (LHC) President, L. Stampi (DSU), H. Wahl (SL). The ndings of the committee were submitted
to the Director General on 20th May 1997.
2 Location: BA3 (bat. 870), the heart of the SPS.
BA3 is a vast hall, 90 m long by 21 m wide and 8 m high, devoid of any separating walls and connected to the
annex BB3 (65 m X 20 m) by a 30 m long passageway. The complex is completed by BAE3, which adds around
1000 m
2
on two levels. The total surface area is in excess of 4000 m
2
. No doors of any kind separate BA3 from
the annexes. Detailed layout drawings of BA3/BAE3, and BB3 are available as: SPS EY 3001 0 and SPS EY
3000 0 respectively.
So much equipment fundamental to the functioning of the SPS is contained within this building complex,
that it can rightly be called the heart of the machine. The following list is by no means complete, but gives an
idea of the building's importance:
 Power Converters
{ All main quadrupoles plus spare.
{ Sextant 3 main dipoles.
{ Chromaticity sextupoles.
{ Landau damping octupoles.
{ Skew quadrupoles.
{ Sextant 3 orbit correction dipoles.
 Radio Frequency
{ Power converters and transmitters for 200MHz travelling wave proton acceleration system.
{ Power converters and transmitters for 200MHz standing wave lepton acceleration system.
{ Low level and interlock electronics for the above systems.
 Electrical Distribution
{ Electrical cells for 18 kV stable and pulsed Loops.
{ No-Break power supplies for local equipment.
{ 48V cells for control, alarms, etc.
{ Auxiliary compensator.
 Other Equipment
{ H.V. Supplies for vacuum pumps and electronics for sector valves and pressure gauges of sextant 3.
{ Beam position monitors for sextant 3.
{ Timing electronics.
{ Controls network racks.
{ Cooling plant for above mentioned power converters and associated magnets.
A malfunction in any of these systems is sucient to stop the SPS. The LEP machine is also aected since
its beam is supplied by the SPS. The complexity of the building is compounded by the fact that all cables pass
under a false oor, which covers 90% of the total surface.
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3 Description of Incident
At around 06:30 on the 13th May 1997 (see [2] for precise timing) a re occurred in one of four 1 MW power
converters that supply the 200 MHz proton acceleration RF system located in BA3. PCR personnel saw smoke
in BA3 and called the re brigade, whose response was very rapid as they were already on the Prevessin site.
The re was extinguished during a 20-minute intervention. Direct material damage at rst sight appeared to
be limited within the power converter cabinet and vertically above. More worrying was the fact that the whole
building was lled with thick black smoke. A detailed technical description of the causes of the re is contained
in [1]
Following standard procedure, the re brigade contacted the chemists of TIS-GS who in turn, after investiga-
tion, made contact with the specialist company Reichenberger AG (RAG) [3]. Other people informed included
the Director General, the Director of Accelerators, TIS and SL Division Leaders, the SL Crisis Co-ordinator,
the Legal Service and the insurance company Mobiliere Suisse. This rapidity of reaction turned out to be crucial
to setting up the recovery process.
As soon as the re was extinguished, and in parallel with the actions above, the remen began to evacuate
the smoke by opening all doors and installing smoke extractors. Once the initial smoke cloud had dissipated
suciently, drying and heating equipment was installed by RAG to reduce the levels of humidity (heavy rain fell
throughout the intervention period). The doors were closed and access to the buildings was prohibited during
the drying process. At the request of the RAG specialists the normal ventilation system was not used for drying
as the resulting turbulence would have further distributed soot throughout the equipment.
4 Material Damage
The 1 MW power converter, which was the seat of the re, was completely destroyed and had to be replaced,
but on the horizontal plane the re was well contained within its steel cabinet. An electrical distribution rack
in very close proximity and several adjacent false oorboards, were however damaged by the heat and also had
to be replaced. The paint of several nearby racks was blackened, but it was possible for these to be cleaned and
repainted, their contents being undamaged.
More damage was sustained vertically above the re due to rising heat and the action of the ventilation
system. Unfortunately the overhead crane had been parked immediately above the power converter and therefore
sustained considerable heating necessitating its replacement. The power rails for the crane had completely
melted over a length of 3 m. Nearby cables and lighting were also extensively burned,and many of the uorescent
tubes had exploded. Due to the fact that the cost of cleaning was greater than the price of replacement, all
cable trays and overhead lighting (including emergency lights) were renewed.
It was immediately evident that the steel of the roof had suered, the extent of which was revealed when




5 Pollution: Acid, heavy-metals.
It was clearly apparent that all surfaces inside the building were covered with black soot. All the equipment
in the hall of BA3 was aected, as were the walls, oor and ceiling of the building. Due to the eect of the
ventilation system, all racks were polluted inside their enclosing cabinets, and of course the labyrinthine area
beneath the false-oor with its congestion of cables and pipes was just as badly aected. Within the hall, the
Faraday cage containing RF low level electronics, and the computer room were apparently also aected but to
a slightly lesser extent. The same was true for BB3.
Since the installation which had been burnt was in the order of 25 years old, the major immediate worry
was that the smoke contained chloric acid produced by the burning of PVC insulated cables. The soot, which
was observed to be present even inside racks and on electronic cards, was electrically conducting and would
produce short-circuits if not removed.
The burned power converter contained 2 mercury-based ignitrons, only one of which, whose container was
split, was to be found in the debris. The ignitrons contained a total of 94 cc of mercury, a certain amount
of which remained inside the broken container and more was found mixed with water (condensation) in the
cabinet tray. Exact measurements of the amount of remaining mercury were impossible, but around 80 cc were
estimated to be missing, vapourised.
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6 Analyses: What to clean & method to be employed.
To a large extent it was very obvious which parts of the building and its infrastructure needed to be replaced or
cleaned, and RAG was well aware of the prescribed method. A certain amount of obvious work could therefore
be undertaken in parallel with the taking of samples and before receiving the results of the analyses.
The analyses served two distinct though associated purposes. Firstly they established the conditions under
which the work would be carried out from the Safety/Hygiene point of view, and secondly, the level of equipment
cleaning necessary and hence the method to be employed.
The independent Swiss institute Eidgenossische Material-Prufungs und Forschungs-Anstalt (l'EMPA) of
Dubendorf, was called in to take samples for analysis from all aected areas [4]. Analyses of the air of the
building were made by the Institut Universitaire Romand de Sante au Travail (IST) de Lausanne and also
Service de l'Ecotoxicologue Cantonal de la Republique et Canton de Geneve (Ecotox) together with the CERN
chemists. Traces of mercury were indeed found. Evidence of lead and cadmium pollution, were also detected,
the levels of which were far below the limiting values published by the Swiss Caisse Nationale d'Assurance
(SUVA).
No trace of heavy metals was found beyond the connes of BA3.
6.1 Personnel (health and safety)
Results of the EMPA analyses showed that the major pollution from heavy metals was concentrated as particles
on the ceiling of the hall, in the ventilation lters and in the bre glass insulation of the building walls. The
decision was taken by the CERN Chemists and Medical Service to impose the wearing of full protective overalls,
as well as lter nose/mouth masks for all who entered the BA3 complex. Those RAG personnel who worked on
cleaning the ceiling wore full-face masks. Once the ceiling was clean, further analyses of the air were taken, and
work was allowed to continue without the masks, except for those employed upon removal of the wall breglass
and the ventilation system where a certain amount of dust disturbance was inherent in the process.
In view of the presence of heavy metals, the CERN Medical Service organised systematic medical visits
(haematology & urology) for everyone working in the buildings in question, whether CERN, contractor or from
an outside company. In the order of 150 people were controlled and no evidence was found in anyone of heavy
metal contamination due to exposure in BA3[5].
6.2 Equipment
As l'EMPA processed each set of analyses, the results were faxed to RAG and CERN at the BA3 site to allow
work to progress on several fronts without waiting for the nal report. Due to the extent of the pollution and
the complexity of the equipment and building, several visits were needed to complete sample gathering. Results
concerning mercury pollution were inherently long (4 days), whereas acid levels were received 1 day after sample
taking. A full report of all of the results is available for consultation from the authors or a copy can be ordered
directly from l'EMPA, but is not annexed herewith in view of its bulk [4].
Soot on building and equipment surfaces had to be removed to prevent it eventually nding its way into
the electronic components under the inuence of the ventilation system with the risk of causing short-circuits.
Where analysis showed only soot to be present, the degree of pollution was simply determined visually. Since
there are no recognised reference limits for soot pollution, the method and degree of cleaning was largely decided
by RAG for each piece of equipment, based upon previous experience.
In order to eliminate the risk of corrosion due to hydrochloric acid attack, it was necessary to clean all
building and external cabinet surfaces where the acid concentration was above 15 g=cm
2
. All exposed surfaces
of BA3, BB3 & BAE3 including oor, walls, ceiling, beneath the false-oor and all cabinet and equipment
surfaces needed to be most thoroughly cleaned. Electronic and electric components with less than 5 g=cm
2
of
pollution were not cleaned, and anything over 10 g=cm
2
required thorough cleaning by immersion. All of the
components situated in the main BA3 and BAE3 halls were found to be heavily polluted with acid and soot.
7 Cleaning Process
Priority was given to the ceiling of BA3, the cleaning of which, it was feared, would further pollute the equipment
beneath with dust containing soot, acid and heavy metals. A load-bearing false ceiling was hung from the rafters,
2 m below the roof of BA3, covering the entire surface of the building. This installation made possible cleaning
work on the ceiling, protected people and equipment beneath from dust and falling objects, allowed cleaning
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above and below to progress in parallel and provided protection during removal of the burned roof section.
Later it also facilitated the replacement of the cabling and lighting installations mentioned above.
Firstly, vacuum cleaners with special cooled lters were used on all surfaces followed by humid cleaning with
proprietary RAG cleansing and neutralising detergents. Special attention was paid to the oor and ceiling.
Electronic components situated in the main BA3 hall which were heavily polluted with acid and soot, were
removed wholesale from their racks, immersed in cleaning and neutralising baths, subsequently dried in vacuum
ovens, and stored until the building was clean enough for re-installation. Faraday Cage modules, which were
thankfully aected only by soot, were cleaned dry in situ by arranging air to be blown in above and sucked into
vacuum cleaners below. BB3 and most of its equipment were also only supercially dry cleaned.
Great care was taken to assure that all the cleaning uids used were recuperated and disposed of in the
manner prescribed by the chemists of TIS-GS. No pollution of the drainage system was detected.
Porous materials such as the breglass matting wall insulation and the acoustic insulation around the cooling
pump zone were unable to be cleaned and had simply to be replaced.
The greatest cleaning problems were posed by electrical distribution cells and no-break power supplies,
especially in their H.T. and mechanical parts. Since a complete strip-down of these devices was necessary, and
in view of their age and complexity, it was felt to be prudent to involve the manufactures of the apparatus
in the cleaning process. In some instances, high-tension specialists needed to readjust cables and connectors
after re-installation by RAG. Despite all eorts, two of the older no-break power supplies were unusable after
cleaning and had to be replaced.
8 Organisation of Eort
In view of the scale of the BA3 repair and clean up, it turned out to be essential for a co-ordination team of two
people to take overall responsibility for the work. Apart from organising the eort from the CERN side, and
installing necessary infrastructure at the scene of the work, their role was to interface with the outside rms
(mainly RAG) together with the insurance companies, chemists, medical service, press oce and legal service.
It was also their role to organise regular information meetings and ensure that status bulletins were issued.
First predictions from RAG, based solely upon professional experience, suggested that their work would take
in the order of 2 months. Once the co-ordination team understood the scale of the operation, an information
meeting was called including RAG, the Insurance Company and its experts and from CERN the SL Division
Leader, the Director of Acclerators, the TIS chemists and Doctors, and specialists of the equipment involved.
The main aim of the meeting was to make everyone aware of the scale of the repair, and to allow RAG to
explain the method of work. Ground-rules were set for the coming weeks, such as:
 Priorities to be set by the co-ordinators.
 Only the co-ordinators were to interface between CERN and RAG to avoid conict of interests.
 CERN services were made aware of the exceptional urgency of the situation.
 CERN specialist presence in BA3 was to be only by invitation of the co-ordinators.
 A specialist was to be named for each set of equipment.
 Regular weekly meetings were to be held between RAG and CERN specialists.
 Weekly meetings with the Insurance Company and its experts were also organised.
As the electrical distribution system was polluted, temporary supplies were necessary and a representative
of the power distribution service was nominated to take overall responsibility for electricity and to assure a
permanent presence during the work.
As the work later progressed it became increasingly evident that certain of the decisions taken at the rst
meeting were of vital importance, other measures were later instigated as their need was felt.
So many demands were received from the owners of the equipment that without the co-ordinators, RAG
would quickly have become submerged in conicting requests. The temporary electrical supply situation became
rapidly extremely complex and the permanent presence of a team of electricians was necessary under the lead-
ership of a technician not only highly competent technically, but also very conscious of the safety considerations
involved. A security linkman was nominated by TIS-GS to help with the personnel safety of the hundred or so
people involved at any given time.
Communication proved to be a most dicult area to deal with. Despite the fact that many dierent media
were employed (information meetings, E-mail, WWW, weekly bulletin, SPS page1 & LEP page101, etc.) there
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were areas where important messages just did not get through. In a future crisis of this magnitude, the
importance of information communication should be emphasised.
The SL division DPO was made responsible for all nancial aspects, a special budget code was quickly
made available greatly facilitating equipment and service commands. Close contact was maintained with the
insurance experts, whose rapid acceptance of expenditure was also instrumental in minimising overall duration.
9 Planning
Since CERN lacked experience of this type of situation, and despite the reassurance of the insurance experts,
there was an uneasy feeling of total dependence upon RAG, both technically and as far as time estimates were
concerned. Help from the planning department (AC-DI) was instrumental in demonstrating that given close
collaboration, and by working day and night shifts, a saving of two weeks on the original time estimate was
possible. The planning charts provided a focal point for discussion, and the visual representation of the way in
which the work advanced was a boon to everyone involved. Using the charts, the importance of the time factor
was more easily stressed, and a greater portion of the control passed to CERN, reducing the dependency upon
RAG.
10 Safety Considerations
The Weingarten report [1] deals fully with the safety aspects of the BA3 work, but for the sake of completeness,
and in order to reinforce a most important message, it is useful to make certain reminders herein.
Once the problems of pollution and associated personnel protection were dealt with, by far the most po-
tentially hazardous area was the temporary electrical distribution installation. Sterling work was carried out
by the electrical service, not only with regard to general safety of temporary installations but also in ensuring
the electrical safety of all installations during the cleaning process and later during the testing phase. Before
a particular piece of equipment was made available to RAG for cleaning, both the owner and the electricity
service established an 'Autorisation de Travail' form declaring that it was electrically safe. Once the cleaning
was nished, the corresponding 'Fin de Travail' form was completed by RAG to indicate that they would make
no further interventions.
It was virtually impossible to stay abreast of the problem of open oorboards. Especially during the period
of cleaning under the false oor, it became a full time job for CERN and the RAG foremen to keep up with
the advancing work. Thanks to the deployment of tapes, chains and barriers to indicate missing boards, no one
was injured by falling into holes in the oor (statistically the most frequent accident at CERN).
One person was however injured when he fell from the false ceiling during its removal. It was surprising
that more accidents did not take place during this particular operation, the work force of the sub-contractor in
question was obviously determined to nish the job within the day, not wanting to incur the expense of a stay-
over. Despite several safety-related improvements imposed by CERN personnel, the situation remained typical
of a job being carried out by people brought in a long way from home, and given a price for the completion of
the work rather than an hourly rate. Such a situation must be avoided in future, crisis or no crisis.
Another area of potential danger was the car park and access roads to the aected buildings. These zones
were variously taken over for temporary oce space, temporary toilets, open-air workshops, storage areas, and
rubbish containers. Limited parking was assured, but more importantly access for the re brigade was always
maintained and whenever necessary lorries, cranes and containers were able to safely come and go. The area
became much more heavily populated than usual, but since the Service De Guardienage took the trac problem
seriously from the outset, very few problems were encountered. The same service also oversaw personnel access
to BA3 while the normal access system with card readers was out of action. One slight accident did occur when
an appliance fell from a delivery truck slightly injuring the driver as he released the securing belts.
11 Post Mortem
Once the work in BA3 was nished, and equipment tests had shown that the SPS was in a state to full its
normal role, a nal co-ordination meeting was organised with a view to collating the views of the dierent
services involved in the repair. All the equipment and safety groups were invited, together with the CERN
doctors, chemists, remen and the legal service. Rrepresentatives of RAG and the insurance experts were also
invited. Comments and criticism of all kinds, both positive and negative, relative to the re and recovery were
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freely encouraged, the aim being to produce a list of 'DOs' and 'DON'Ts' which could serve as a check-list in a
possible future incident of a similar nature.
Remarks issuing from the post mortem are included in the following section, which also contains ideas and
improvements that manifested themselves during the recovery period.
12 Lessons & Conclusions
The following points are not considered to be in any particular order of importance. There is a certain chronology
to the ordering however, which may be benecial if this section is to serve as a checklist in future.
 Rapid intervention essential. Signs of hydrochloric acid corrosion were clearly visible only two days
after the re.
 Co-ordination Team Vital. It is vital to establish a co-ordination team immediately. In the case of the
BA3 incident, two co-ordinators took care of the technical and infrastructure work, an electricity technician
oversaw the global situation of electricity supply and the SL division DPO dealt with nances. With
hindsight, the team would have been improved by the addition of a further person to handle communication
(E-mail, WWW, SLNEWS, Teletext, etc.).
 No work to start until risks assessed (pollution).
 No Compromise on Safety. A safety linkman was necessary for work on this scale.
 Communication / Information Vital. This area could have been better dealt with. One LEP experi-
ment was almost late for start-up due to lack of information. NOT TO BE UNDERESTIMATED.
 Close contact with insurance, quick response necessary. A good working relationship with, and
quick response from, the insurance experts was instrumental in keeping time to a minimum.
 Quick response from CERN services. Speed of intervention by the various CERN services involved
was of primary importance in minimising the overall duration. Whether it was the legal or transport
service, the doctors or the remen, it was vital that they were aware of the urgency of the situation from
the outset.
 Infrastructure necessary (toilets, tel. fax. PC. parking, soft drinks machine etc.) Many of the
necessary services were available close by in PCR. Had this not been the case it would have been necessary
to install them. RAG understood this problem very well and immediately installed oces, stores and
workshops and requested telephone, fax and network connections. Temporary toilets and showers were
set up adjacent to the work site in accordance with French Securite de Travail regulations. The 500 m
2
tent which served as the electronics cleaning workshop saved an incalculable amount of time, without it
components would have had to be shipped to RAG H.Q. for cleaning.
 All samples of pollution to be taken early. All samples were taken in time, but there were a few
surprises in the later batches.
 Close collaboration between CERN specialist and RAG. It would be a mistake to naively allow
cleaning of equipment, without contact with the specialist. The (few) problems encountered with the RAG
work all involved equipment where the specialist was less present.
 Electricity Overseer |{key man. The BA3 situation rapidly became very complex, the chief electrician
needed to be competent, responsible and safety-conscious.
 Document for future reference...(reports, minutes, photos, videos). Another area not to be
underestimated. Again RAG understood this issue very well.
 Co-ordinators must retain responsibility. No one else must plan. They are the only people with
a wide enough overview.
 Biggest Co-ordination Problem...non-availability of CERN Sta. Despite E-mail, mobile tele-
phones etc. an inordinate amount of time was spent in trying to locate CERN sta responsible for dierent
activities when immediate decisions were to be made.
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13 Post Scriptum
The quality of the BA3 recovery work was proven by the speed of the subsequent start-up and the eciency
with which the SPS ran during the ensuing physics period. The overall eciency gure of 80% of realised hours
with respect to programmed hours was the same both before and after the re. However, statistics show that in
the 2 months following the clean up, there were more short (under 1hr) interventions on the BA3 RF equipment
compared with before the re. The global RF downtime has not increased signicantly, but the number of short
stops rose from roughly 6 or 7 per month prior to the re, to between 20 and 30 per month since.
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